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ABSTRACT: One potential major role of social economy organizations in sustain-
ability transitions is the creation and mobilization of social capital. Yet, the social
economy gathers very distinct organizational models which may be associated with
different types and levels of social capital. Accordingly, the objective of this article is to
explore whether, and if so how, the type and level of social capital differ between mutual
benefit organizations – which essentially seek to meet their members’ needs – and public
benefit organizations – which seek to enhance the well-being of a broader community or
the society as a whole. The study draws on an econometric analysis of different forms
of social capital in two renewable energy cooperatives which are located in Flanders
but have clearly divergent orientations toward mutual versus public benefit. The re-
sults show that, as compared with an orientation toward public benefit, an orientation
toward mutual benefit is associated with lower social identification with the coopera-
tive and weaker ties between members. Our study explores the underlying explanatory
mechanisms behind these relationships. Its findings contribute to understanding the
potential roles played by cooperatives in sustainability transitions.
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1 Introduction
Sustainability transition scholars have often stressed the crucial role that grassroots
actors, including organizations belonging to the ‘social economy’, may play in this pro-
cess as important vehicles for socio-economic innovations (e.g. Seyfang and Smith 2007;
Smith 2012; Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012). While the concept of sustainability transition
gained interest only a few years ago, the social economy is a relatively old movement
since it can be traced back to the 19th century. It gathers organizations with diverse le-
gal forms – non-profits, cooperatives, mutual societies, charities and other not-for-profit
forms depending on legal environments – which seek to integrate concerns other than
mere profit maximization and are often characterized by democratic and participatory
governance structure (Defourny and Develtere 2000). Arguably, one of the major po-
tential contributions of social economy (SE) organizations to sustainability transitions
consists in creating and/or mobilizing social capital, given the important roles personal
interactions and social networks typically play in their business models. Despite a lack
of consensual and established definition, most scholars accord to define the concept of
social capital on a generic level in terms of trust, cooperation and civic-minded behavior
(Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995). A strengthened social capital is con-
sidered by an increasing number of scholars to be an essential contribution to foster
communities’ potential of building sustainability locally and enhancing possibilities to
deal with collective action and societal challenges: if people trust each other, they are
more likely to sustain mutually productive social exchanges, even if these come at a
cost for participants taken individually (e.g. Bowles and Gintis 2002; Ostrom 2003).
Indeed, social capital has been shown to be empirically linked to various collective out-
comes, some of which are directly relevant to sustainability transitions, such as climate
change adaptation (Adger 2003), associational and community volunteerism (Stu¨rmer
and Kampmeier 2003; Prouteau and Wolff 2004), democracy and governance (Brehm
and Rahn 1997; Rothstein 2001; Rothstein and Eek 2009), natural resource manage-
ment (Ostrom 1994), economic development (Knack and Keefer 1997; Narayan and
Cassidy 2001) and health (Kawachi et al. 1997).
Yet, the social economy gathers very different organizational models, which,
though often overlooked by the transition literature, may be associated with distinct
types and levels of social capital. In particular, the distinction between ‘public benefit’
and ‘mutual benefit’ organizations appears to be relevant in this respect (Somerville and
McElwee 2011; Lang and Roessl 2011a; Hatak et al. 2016). Historically, public benefit
has been associatedwith non-profit organizations andmost charities, andmutual benefit
with the whole range of cooperative and mutual organizations (Gui 1991; Ben-Ner and
Gui 2000). In recent years, however, cooperatives have mushroomed in fields where his-
torically they had not been widespread (e.g. health and care, services to disadvantaged
people, etc.) and in emerging fields or subfields, such as fair trade (Huybrechts 2007),
renewable energy (Huybrechts and Mertens 2014; Bauwens et al. 2016) or microfinance
and ethical banking (Bauwens 2010; Pe´rilleux et al. 2011). These ‘new’ cooperatives or
cooperative-like organizations distinguish themselves from the traditional ones, notably
by their stronger orientation towards general interest goals rather than the mere satis-
faction of member needs (Borzaga and Santuari 2001; Borzaga and Spear 2004). In this
perspective, these new models represent hybrids between traditional cooperatives and
non-profit organizations, combining key features of both legal forms (Defourny 2001;
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Spear and Bidet 2005; Hatak et al. 2016). One example of this renewal is provided by
Italian social cooperatives, which started emerging in the late 1980s and combine char-
acteristics of non-profit voluntary organizations with the cooperative form (Borzaga and
Santuari 2001; Mancino and Thomas 2005; Picciotti et al. 2014; Becchetti and Pisani
2015).1
It has theoretically been argued that the type of social capital generated in cooper-
atives differs depending on how they prioritize mutual benefit or public benefit in their
model (Hatak et al. 2016). Yet, very few studies to our knowledge have sought to ana-
lyze this question empirically. Given this lack of empirical evidence, this article seeks
to address the following research question: do the type and level of social capital differ
in cooperatives focused on mutual benefit as compared to cooperatives oriented toward
public benefit and, if so, how? It does so through the comparative analysis of two re-
newable energy (RE) cooperatives, BeauVent and Ecopower, located in Flanders, i.e. the
Northern part of Belgium. RE cooperatives seem to illustrate the newmodels of coopera-
tives mixing mutual benefit and a strong orientation toward public benefit. They enable
citizens to collectively own and manage renewable energy projects at the local level.
Through this model, citizens produce, invest in and, in some cases, consume renewable
energy. Combining economic, social and environmental aims, RE cooperatives and, more
generally, community-based energy schemes are increasingly perceived as potentially
key actors in the transition toward low-carbon energy systems (Seyfang et al. 2013) and
may enhance social acceptability of technologies at the local level (Bauwens 2015).
The two cooperatives studied here differ in a crucial way: in addition to RE gen-
eration, Ecopower is an electricity supplier while BeauVent is a generation cooperative
only and does not undertake any supply activity. Thus, the traditional identification of
members and users is present in the former but absent in the latter. Three different
forms of social capital are considered: social identification with the cooperative, general-
ized interpersonal trust and network structure. The results show that the type and level
of social capital differ indeed depending on whether the cooperative is oriented toward
mutual or public benefit. On average, an orientation toward public/mutual benefit is
associated with higher/lower social identification and stronger/weaker social bonds
between members. This relationship is mediated by spatial factors and the structure
of social interactions within organizations. Indeed, Ecopower’s shift from a public to
a mutual benefit orientation when it started supplying electricity was accompanied
by sustained organizational and geographical growth which, in turn, increased spatial
distance between cooperative members. Moreover, this shift corresponded to a heavier
reliance on market interactions. The combination of these two phenomena contributed
to a dilution of the social capital of the organization.
This article is structured as follows. The following section offers some theoretical
elements about cooperatives and how they relate to the concept of social capital. Section
3 presents the methodology used, Section 4 analyzes the collected data and Section 5
discusses these findings in an attempt to answer our initial question.
1 The development of similar organizational models can be seen in many other national
contexts and has been encouraged by the introduction of new legal forms: the social solidarity
cooperative in Portugal (1998), the social initiative cooperative in Spain (1999), the French collec-
tive interest cooperative (2001), the community interest company in the UK (2004), etc. (Borzaga
and Defourny 2001).
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2 Theoretical framework
2.1 The multidimensionality of social capital
Given the multidimensional character of social capital (e.g. Paldam 2000), we
focus on three interrelated yet distinct components of social capital that are commonly
distinguished in the literature (see e.g. Brunie 2009): generalized interpersonal trust,
social identification with the group and social network structure. First, generalized
interpersonal trust refers to the ‘values and attitudes that influence how people relate
to each other and that predispose them to cooperate, trust, understand and empathize
with each other’ (Brunie 2009: 257). It is a somewhat abstract and pervasive concept
as it is not limited to known individuals and translates into a general propensity to
trust and cooperate with others beyond specific settings and purposes. In this sense, it
differs from the ‘thick’ trust or strong reciprocity (Gintis 2000) associated with dense
and repeated interactions within a well-defined group.
Second, in contrast to the abstraction of generalized trust, social identification,
i.e. the perception of belonging to some human aggregate, is associated with member-
ship affiliation to a specific and well-defined group as well as with the emotional and
affective significance attached to that membership (Tajfel 1978). The socio-psychological
literature on collective action has shown that a strong sense of shared collective iden-
tity fosters cooperative behaviors toward the group (Tyler and Blader 2001). This result
is supported by extensive evidence from experimental settings and the field (Kramer
and Brewer 1984; Brewer and Kramer 1986; Dawes et al. 1988; Brown-Kruse and
Hummels 1993; Goette et al. 2006). For instance, Stu¨rmer and Kampmeier (2003),
relying on experimental and field data, highlight the importance of group identification
as a determinant of community volunteerism and local participation.
Finally, the third component of social capital considered here consists in the net-
work structure (Coleman 1988). Building on the work of Granovetter (1973), two main
types of network structures can be distinguished as far as network density is concerned:
‘tight-knit’, dense social networks in which members have a high number of linkages or
‘strong’ ties with each other are referred to as having a closed network structure while
more diverse social networks in which members have fewer interconnections or ‘weak’
ties are said to have an open network structure.
2.2 Social capital and cooperatives
In the existing literature on social capital and cooperatives, social capital has si-
multaneously been seen as a necessary condition for organizational development and
a potential outcome of cooperative behaviors within organizations in a mutually rein-
forcing fashion: ‘trust lubricates cooperation [ . . . ] and cooperation itself builds trust’
(Putnam 1993: 171).
Regarding social capital as a condition for the development of cooperatives, found-
ing and maintaining cooperatives and other forms of mutual aid and solidarity requires
a group of potential members able to provide the organization with resources which
they would access and mobilize through pre-existing social networks between individ-
uals (Defourny 1995; Fonteneau et al. 1999). For instance, cooperatives obtain vital
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resources from their members (Valentinov 2004), such as access to buying markets (in
the case of marketing cooperatives) to sales markets (in the case of purchasing cooper-
atives), to workforce (in the case of producer cooperatives), etc. Thus, members’ social
capital is a key resource upon which cooperative organizations are built (Spear 2000).
As regards social capital as an outcome of pro-social behaviors within cooperative
organizations, it has been argued that face-to-face and frequent contacts in coopera-
tives foster the development of social capital and norms of trust (Birch and Whittam
2008). In his influential book, Putnam (1993) argued that cooperatives and voluntary
associations positively affect social capital by transferring to their members habits of co-
operation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness. Likewise, Degli Antoni and Portale (2011)
show that inclusive participatory governance in Italian social cooperatives is positively
– if unclearly – related to employees’ and members’ social capital.
In contrast, it can be argued that the importance of social capital (whether seen
as a cause or an effect of interactions within firms) is generally lower in for-profit orga-
nizations as compared to cooperatives, since the former rely relatively more on market
interactions, which typically lack the personal elements of non-market connections, at
least where markets approximate the ideal complete-contracting of standard economic
models (Bowles 1998; Bowles andGintis 2002). For sure, this reflects a continuum rather
than a clear-cut distinction. First, cooperatives are also economic enterprises that oper-
ate on a market, and thus the importance of social capital depends on how personal and
market interactions are prioritized in their business model. Second, even in for-profit
enterprises, market interactions do not make social capital redundant because trustwor-
thiness and other social norms facilitate market exchange, especially when contracts are
incomplete or unenforceable. As Granovetter (1985) argues, market relations are always
embedded in social ones to some extent.
For short, social capital is simultaneously a cause and an effect of participation in
cooperatives. The objective here is not to disentangle this mutual causation but try and
analyze, rather, how institutional and other contextual factors may shape the creation
of social capital.
2.3 The contextualization of social capital
Social relationships do not emerge ex nihilo. They are embedded in particular
institutional and spatio-temporal contexts (Lang and Roessl 2011a, 2011b).What follows
focuses on three contextual dimensions shaping social capital that are directly relevant
to our concern: the distinction between mutual and public benefit organizations, the
spatial dimension of social capital and the relationship between organizational growth
and social capital.
2.3.1 Mutual versus public benefit organizations
According to the traditional economic theory of the firm, the ownership structure
of an organization is defined by the allocation of two formal rights: the residual control
rights (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990) and the rights to residual
surplus (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Gui (1991) respectively calls the beneficiaries of
these two rights the ‘dominant category’ and the ‘beneficiary category’. The residual
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control by the dominant category refers to the ultimate decision-making power which is
not shared with other stakeholders according to the statutes or by contract (Bauwens
and Lemaıˆtre 2014). As for the beneficiary category, it refers to the category owning the
rights to the residual surplus of an enterprise. This category, for instance, can be buyers
or sellers (through lower or higher prices respectively), consumers of non-excludable
goods, aid recipients (getting goods or services for free), workers (through better pay) and
investors (through higher return on investments).2 These criteria enable us to derive one
crucial distinction between SE organizations and traditional for-profit firms: the latter
are typically defined by the fact that investors are actually the dominant category and
the beneficiary category while dominant and beneficiary categories are never investors
in SE organizations: they may be consumers, workers, volunteers, donors, and so on,
i.e. groups whose main role is not to invest money and whose main concern is not to
maximize return on investment.
Gui (1991) makes a further distinction among SE organizations between, on the
one hand, ‘mutual benefit’ organizations, and, on the other, ‘public benefit’ organizations.
In the former, the dominant and the beneficiary categories coincide, i.e. the dominant
category can manage the organization for its own benefits (e.g. consumer cooperative,
credit cooperative, worker cooperative, mutual societies as well as member-centered
associations in fields of leisure, lobbying, joint representation, etc.), while in the latter
there is a non-coincidence between the dominant and the beneficiary category (e.g.
humanitarian associations such as Oxfam among many others helping disadvantaged
people).
Traditional cooperative firms operating in fields such as agriculture, banking or
retail, act exclusively or primarily in the interest of their members, who are also the
owners. In this sense, they are typical examples of mutual benefit organizations. As
just mentioned, their dominant and beneficiary categories are thus constituted by their
member-users, understood in a broad sense: savers in a credit cooperative, agricultural
producers in an agricultural marketing or purchasing cooperative, consumers in a con-
sumer cooperative, workers in a worker cooperative, etc. (Hansmann 1996). In new
models of cooperatives, the beneficiary category, which has the right on residual sur-
plus, is no longermerely constituted by themembers, butmay include non-member third
parties (Mori 2014). For instance, if an energy cooperative carries out electricity supply
activities with the purpose of getting the lowest possible price for its customer-members,
it would be considered an ordinary mutual benefit organization. However, it would be a
public benefit organization if its central objective were to help the largest possible num-
ber of people, whether they are members or not, to reduce their energy bills. For this
reason, these cooperatives ‘can typically be described as “social enterprises”, together
with other organizational models combining a commercial activity with the pursuit of
social aims’ (Huybrechts and Mertens 2014: 197).
This is not to deny the specific ‘social’ functions exerted by traditional cooperatives
as compared to for-profit firms, which are reflected in their mission (the satisfaction of
2 The distribution of the surplus is not necessarily carried out in an explicit way – under
the form of dividends or boni, for instance – but can also be implicit – as in the case of discounts
for members or an increased quality of goods and services. In this perspective, the expression of
‘potential surplus’ is used to designate the surplus distributed by the organization both in explicit
and implicit ways to the beneficiary category.
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other needs than the remuneration of capital), their governance structure (the primacy
of persons over capital and the principle of democracy) and the various obligations of
‘external’ surplus destination included in ICA principles (Fici 2013).3 The difference
between mutual and public benefit, therefore, is more a matter of degree than kind.
However, besides the already high level of ‘publicness’ common to all cooperatives (at
least in principle) in comparison with classical firms, public benefit cooperatives have an
extra element constituted by their explicit pursuit of the general interest (Fici 2009).4
The orientation toward mutual or public benefit is likely to influence the type
and/or level of social capital in SE organizations. In a conceptual paper focusing on
the case of cooperatives, for instance, Hatak et al. (2016) argue that the orientation to-
ward mutual or public benefit is associated with different types of social capital.5 More
precisely, mutual benefit cooperatives are said to rely on a closed network structure as-
sociated with strong ties between members and group-specific trust. Conversely, public
benefit cooperatives are supposed to be built upon an open network structure associated
with weak ties between members and generalized trust.
2.3.2 The spatial dimension of social capital
In addition to the distinction between mutual and public benefit, the development
of social capital is likely to be mediated by spatial factors (Rutten et al. 2010). First, by
facilitating direct social interactions and face-to-face communication, spatial closeness
further facilitates the activation of social norms in the group (Byrne et al. 2015). Indeed,
shorter physical distances between actors in general mean lower interaction costs than
longer distances (Westlund 1999). Second, social networks in rural areas differ from
those in urban settings in terms of diversity and density (Beggs et al. 1996). Onyx and
Bullen (2000) describe the social capital found in rural areas as ‘bonding’ social capital,
for pointing to higher degrees of mutual trust and support found among residents in
smaller communities than in urban areas.
2.3.3 Organizational growth and social capital
Finally, social capital may be expected to be negatively affected by the growth of SE
organizations. As business operations become more complex and membership becomes
3 These obligations include the constitution of unshareable reserves, benefiting future gener-
ations of members, the provision of support to the cooperative movement and the implementation
of policies for the sustainable development of the community.
4 Note that the ‘publicness’ of an organization also partly depends on the nature of the good
produced and/or commercialized and, in particular, on whether the product is a ‘private’ or a
‘public’ good. In economics, a good is private when the producer bears all the costs of production
and a single consumer enjoys all the benefits of consumption. With public goods, by contrast, it
is impossible to exclude individuals who have not paid for the good from its consumption. Thus,
when an organization produces a public good or an impure public good, it can be argued that it
is relatively more oriented toward public benefit, compared to an organization that produces a
fully private good. This is true for RE cooperatives compared to traditional cooperatives because
renewable energy can be conceptualized as an impure public good (Kotchen andMoore 2007). This
aspect, however, is not considered here.
5 Hatak et al. (2016) use a different terminology. They refer to mutual and public benefit
cooperatives as ‘member-focused’ and ‘third-party-focused’ cooperatives respectively.
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Table 1 – General characteristics of cooperatives
Ecopower BeauVent
Year of creation 1991 2000
Number of full-time equivalent workers 22 5.37
Number of members 47,419 2,391
Total cooperative capital (in euros) 48,328,750 4,781,500
Price of one share (in euros) 250 250
Source: Created by author based on 2013 data provided by the cooperatives.
larger and more heterogeneous, the members’ support to their organization fades (Jones
and Kalmi 2012). For instance, in an empirical survey among the members of a large
traditional Swedish cooperative, Nilsson et al. (2009) show that when members consider
the cooperative to be too large and too complex to be controlled by the membership,
member satisfaction and involvement levels decrease, which in turn is associated with
poor trust in the cooperative board and management. In this perspective, Feng et al.
(2016) show empirically that social capital, expressed in terms of member involvement,
trust, satisfaction and loyalty, correlates negatively with size.
To sum up, the goal of this paper is to explore how the type and level of social
capital differs inmutual and public benefit organizations, while taking into account other
contextual factors, such as the spatial dimension of social capital and organizational
growth.
3 Methodology
3.1 Field setting
The two cooperatives studied here share a number of features: they are located in
Flanders (Belgium); they operate exclusively with renewable energy; they are owned by
individual members who each have equal voting rights and receive limited dividends;
and they are part of theBelgian federation of renewable energy cooperatives REScoop.be.
Where they clearly differ, however, is in their size and in the services they provide to
their members. First of all, Ecopower is an electricity supplier while BeauVent is not.6
When Ecopower started supplying electricity, i.e. when the Belgian electricity market
was liberalized in 2003, its membership rose dramatically as individuals had to become
cooperative members to be supplied with green electricity. Hence, a second important
difference is size: as a result of its activity of electricity supply, Ecopower has grown
substantially and is much larger than BeauVent. In 2014, while the latter had about
2,400 members, Ecopower had over 47,400 and was thus almost twenty times as large
(Table 1).
These characteristics enable us to compare different groups of members within
and across the two organizations. In particular, besides comparing it with BeauVent,
6 Still, although BeauVent itself does not supply electricity, an agreement between both
cooperatives stipulates that BeauVent members can be supplied with electricity by Ecopower
even without being formal members of the latter.
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it is meaningful to distinguish between three phases in Ecopower’s organizational de-
velopment corresponding to different mixes of public and mutual benefit. In the first
phase, from its creation over 1991–99, the purpose of the cooperative was to gather
small amounts of money from motivated individuals to finance the refurbishment of
small hydropower installations. As such, over this period, the cooperative itself was not
involved in any energy production activities. As a result, this phase is fully character-
ized by an orientation toward public benefit, since there was no residual surplus to be
distributed to members. The second phase corresponds to the 2000–02 period. It started
with the installation of three wind turbines in the city of Eeklo, which were financed by a
recruitment campaign launched in 2000. Over this period, the cooperative was relatively
more oriented toward mutual benefit compared to the previous phase; this is because
the cooperative started distributing some of its residual surplus to its members under
the form of dividends (the cooperative distributed 6 per cent dividends in each year of
that period). The third phase is identified with the start of electricity supply in 2003 and
extends to the present. Parallel to its supply activities, Ecopower continues to invest in
RE projects. This phase is characterized by an even stronger orientation toward mutual
benefit relative to the two previous phases, because aside from distributing dividends,
Ecopower also started supplying its members with electricity at production cost, i.e.
without making a profit. As an additional benefit attached to membership, Ecopower
members then had the possibility to switch to an electricity tariff that, in most cases,
was cheaper than that of other suppliers.7
3.2 Data collection
Quantitative data were collected by an online questionnaire survey conducted
between May and June 2014 to address the two research questions. The cooperatives
provided members’ email addresses. 36,642 emails were sent to Ecopower members and
849 were sent to BeauVent members. In addition, a paper version of the questionnaire
was handed out during the General Assembly of both organizations with the objective of
reaching a profile of people whowould not have been reached by the online questionnaire.
Indeed, the participants to the General Assemblies are typically an older public with a
presumably lower usage of the Internet. 195 paper versions of the questionnaire were
handed out in the general assembly of Ecopower and 43 during that of BeauVent. All
in all, out of the 37,729 copies distributed in total, 4061 respondents participated in the
survey. This represents a response rate of 10.8 per cent.
Different biases could arise from survey measures, such as selection issues
or measurement errors. As regards the representativeness of our sample, while our
7 It should be noted that the dividends and electricity supply at production cost should be
considered simultaneously to accurately determine the orientation toward mutual benefit. If,
for instance, Ecopower had decreased its dividends when it started supplying electricity, the
organization would not have been more oriented toward mutual benefit compared to the previous
period, because the two effects on members’ surplus would have cancelled out. This was not the
case, however, since Ecopower continued distributing 6 per cent dividends after 2003. Thus, the
policy of dividend distribution being unchanged, the possibility of being supplied at a cheaper
price compared to those of competitors does indeed result in a higher orientation toward mutual
benefit.
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Table 2 – Weighting factors used in the data analysis
Period of membership (in years)
0 ≤ x < 5 5 ≤ x< 10 10 ≤ x< 15 15 ≤ x< 20 20 < x
Antwerp 1.056 0.845 0.724 0.015 0.120
Brussels 1.170 0.936 0.802 0.016 0.132
Limburg 1.240 0.993 0.850 0.017 0.140
East-Flanders 1.199 0.960 0.822 0.016 0.136
Flemish Brabant 1.069 0.856 0.733 0.015 0.121
West-Flanders 1.325 1.061 0.909 0.018 0.150
Other 1.170 0.936 0.802 0.016 0.132
Source: Created by author based on 2013 data provided by the cooperatives.
response rate averages that obtained in similar surveys (e.g. Litvine and Wu¨stenhagen,
2011), drawing firm conclusions about the generality of members calls for caution.
To improve the representativeness of the sample, we have weighted our sample data
so that the characteristics of the sample better match some characteristics of the
population as a whole. More precisely, information about the location of members and
their period of membership (i.e. how long individuals have belonged to the cooperative)
was available for the whole underlying population of cooperative members. In order to
improve the representativeness of the collected sample regarding these variables, their
distribution was computed for the whole population and compared to their distribution
in the sample. Weights were then assigned to the observations with the view of
reproducing the distributions of the aforementioned variables in the collected sample,
using post-stratification adjustments (Table 2). Post-stratification classifies the sample
by group or stratum based on the characteristics of the population and then weights
individuals in each group up to the population total in that group, with values above 1.00
boosting the weight given to data collected from participants in the relevant group, and
vice versa.
3.3 Variables
3.3.1 Measures of social capital
Generalized interpersonal trust (TRUST)wasmeasured using three items selected
from the World Value Survey (WVS): ‘Would you say that most people can be trusted,
or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’, ‘Do you think that most people
would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?’
and ‘Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are
mostly looking out for themselves?’. They were answered through a seven-point Likert
scale. These three items were then aggregated into a single summative scale (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.82).
Social identification (SOCIDENT) was measured by five items adapted from exist-
ing studies (Tyler and Blader 2001; Stu¨rmer and Kampmeier 2003). Social identification
entails a cognitive component (a cognitive sense of belonging to a group), an affective
component (a sense of emotional involvement with the group) and an evaluative
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Table 3 – Number and proportions of members by category
Category
Number of
members in the
population (%)
Number of
members in the
sample
Proportion in the
sample without
weighting factors
Proportion in the
sample with
weighting factors
Ecopower 1 47 (0.09%) 43 1.32% 0.071%
Ecopower 2 656 (1.32%) 94 2.72% 2.14%
Ecopower 3 46,716 (93.79%) 3,141 90.75% 92.72%
BeauVent 2,391 (4.80%) 183 5.29% 5.07%
Total 49,810 (100%) 3,4618 100% 100%
Source: Created by author based on 2013 data provided by the cooperatives.
component (a positive or negative value attached to membership). Accordingly, we
sought to collect indicators of these different aspects. The cognitive component was
measured by three items: ‘I have a lot in common with the other members of the
cooperative’, ‘Being a member of the cooperative is an important part of whom I am’,
and ‘I feel attached to the other cooperative members’. One item was used to measure
the evaluative component, or group-based self-esteem: ‘I am proud to be part of the
cooperative’, and another one to measure the affective component: ‘I like talking about
the cooperative in the presence of others’. They were answered through a five-point
Likert scale, from 1 = ‘completely disagree’ to 5 = ‘completely agree’. Together, the five
items formed an internally consistent scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86).
Finally, in order to assess member linkages with other cooperative members
(NETWORK), respondents were asked whether they had other members within their
direct social network (relatives, friends, and neighbors). So, this variable captures the
density of the network of cooperative members.
3.3.2 Explanatory variables
To analyze social capital in relation to the orientation toward mutual or public
benefit, members were asked in what year they joined their cooperative so that their
period of membership (in years) could be computed. The members for whom this infor-
mation was missing were excluded from the analysis. The sample of Ecopower members
was then divided into three categories of cooperative members, which correspond to
the three phases that Ecopower went through described in Section 3.1: those who
joined the cooperative during its first phase (1991–99), those who joined it after the
installation of the first wind turbines (2000–02) and those who joined it after it became
an electricity supplier (2003–today). In the remainder of this article, the different
groups are referred to in the following way: the three successive cohorts of Ecopower
members are respectively called ‘Ecopower 1’, ‘Ecopower 2’ and ‘Ecopower 3’, and
BeauVent members are called ‘BeauVent’. Table 3 presents the number and proportions
of members in each category, based on data for the entire population and for our sample.
As shown in the table, Ecopower 3 is much larger than the other three categories. The
proportions of the different categories in the sample also indicate the presence of a small
sample bias: Ecopower 1, Ecopower 2 and BeauVent are slightly overrepresented and
8 This figure includes the members belonging to both cooperatives.
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Ecopower 3 underrepresented as compared to proportions in the population. However,
the introduction of weighting factors contributes to reduce these biases.
In order to better isolate the differences between organizations, individuals who
were members of both cooperatives were excluded from the analysis. The final sample
used in the analysis contained 3,337 observations.
3.3.3 Control variables
As control variables, data were collected for basic socio-demographic variables
(gender, education, age, income). Respondents were also asked to indicate their postcode
so that their location could be determined.
In addition, data were collected for indicators of socio-psychological variables, in-
cluding feelings of distributive and procedural justice9 and pro-environmental orienta-
tion. As regards individuals’ feelings of procedural and distributive justice, judgements
about justice related to society considered globally were accessed by adapting items used
in organizational psychology (Colquitt 2001) and in a survey about representations of
social justice (Jacquemain 1995). Individuals’ pro-environmental orientation was cap-
tured through two dimensions: pro-environmental self-identity and daily behaviors. In
order to measure the degree of pro-environmental self-identity, six items from existing
questionnaires were selected and adapted (Fielding et al. 2008; Castro et al. 2009; Whit-
marsh and O’Neill 2010). These items measure on a five-point scale the extent to which
the respondent perceives himself as a person concerned with environmental issues. To
measure respondents’ pro-environmental engagement in terms of daily behaviors, pro-
environmental behaviors were selected from existing studies (Delacolette et al. 2011),
such as ‘walk or ride a bike to travel short distances’, ‘avoid plastic bags in shops’ or
‘turn off the tap while brushing my teeth’. Respondents were asked to indicate on a
five-point scale the frequency at which they executed each of the five actions over the
last fortnight. The items were then aggregated into a single summative scale.
Table 4 reports the specific statements for feelings of procedural and distributive
justice and pro-environmental orientation along with statistics to test for internal con-
sistency (item-total correlations and Cronbach’s alpha). The Cronbach’s alpha indicates
good internal consistency.10
In addition, members were asked about their motivations to join the cooperative.
Motivation indicators consist of a series of ordinal variables which have been constructed
by asking respondents to rate on a five-point scale (from 1= ‘not at all’ to 5= ‘completely’)
the extent to which a specific motivation had played a role in their decision to join
the cooperative. More specifically, questions were included to assess the importance of
return on investment and low electricity price. Furthermore, members were asked to
what extent they valued the local production of renewable energy, the democratic control
9 Distributive justice involves the subjective individual estimation of the way benefits and
costs – which may not be merely material – are distributed within a group. Procedural justice
concerns the subjectively perceived fairness of the processes that resolve disputes and allocate
resources.
10 The dimensionality of each series of items has also been tested by conducting exploratory
factor analyses. In each case, the results highlight that the items reflect a unique dimension and
thus confirm the relevance of aggregating them into one single summated score.
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Table 4 – Item–total correlation and Cronbach’s alpha for the different scales
Item–total
correlation and
Cronbach’s alpha
Pro-environmental orientation
1. I feel concerned about climate change. 0.63
2. I think that human activities are one of the main causes of climate change. 0.45
3. I am the type of person who cares about ecology. 0.65
4. I think of myself as an eco-responsible consumer. 0.68
5. I want to feel that I personally contribute to the protection of the
environment.
0.68
6. I like that my family or my friends see me as someone concerned by the
environment
0.57
7. Make short distances on foot or by bike 0.44
8. Avoid plastic bags in shops 0.45
9. Reuse old plastic bags 0.48
10. Buy fruit and vegetables grown locally rather than imported 0.40
11. Turn off the tap while brushing my teeth 0.40
Cronbach’s alpha 0.84
Feelings of distributive justice
1. In our country, there are too many social inequalities. 0.50
2. For an economy to work well there must necessarily be rich and poor
people.
0.51
3. Social equality is a good thing, but we have already been too far in
Belgium.
0.58
Cronbach’s alpha 0.72
Feelings of procedural justice
1. Policy-makers care about what the population thinks. 0.69
2. I have the impression that policy-makers take my opinion into account. 0.73
3. I think that political decisions most of the time are respectful of moral and
ethical values.
0.61
Cronbach’s alpha 0.81
Source: Created by author.
of organizations and the influence of other people’s advice in their decision to join the
cooperative.
Finally, data about the frequency of attendance to general assemblies was also
collected. Respondents had to indicate on a four-point scale the frequency at which
they attended general assemblies (1 = ‘never’, 2 = ‘sometimes’, 3 = ‘often’, 4 =
‘always’).
For simplicity of the analysis, socio-psychological characteristics were transformed
into binary variables taking the value 1 if the respondent’s score was above the median
and 0 otherwise. Table 5 reports the description and summary statistics of all the
dependent and explanatory variables used in the analysis.
3.4 Data analysis
An ordered probit model was used to estimate the intensity of social identification
and generalized interpersonal trust, since these variables are ordinal. The ordered probit
© 2017 The Authors
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics © 2017 CIRIEC
216 THOMAS BAUWENS AND JACQUES DEFOURNY
Table 5 – Descriptive overview of the variables
Variable Description N Mean SD
Measures of social capital
TRUST Ordinal variable taking the value 1 to 7 3299 4.57 1.09
SOCIDENT Ordinal variable taking the value 1 to 5 3327 3.25 0.89
NETWORK = 1 if member has other coop members in
social networks
3294 0.58 0.49
Control variables
EDUCATION Ordinal variable taking the value 1 if
secondary education, 2 if superior
non-university education and 3 if
university education
3273 3.06 0.77
INCOME Ordinal variable taking the value 1 if
household income <2000€/month, 2 if
2000 < household income
<€4000/month and 3 if household
income >€4000/month
2945 2.05 0.67
GENDER = 1 if individual is a man 3322 0.82 0.38
AGE Age in years 3333 49.07 11.99
DEMOCRATIC = 1 if importance of democratic control of
organizations = 4 or 5
3337 0.48 0.50
GREEN = 1 if importance of local production of
renewable energy = 4 or 5
3337 0.71 0.46
ROI = 1 if importance of ROI = 4 or 5 3337 0.26 0.44
PRICE = 1 if importance of electricity price = 4 or
5
3337 0.55 0.50
ADVICE = 1 if importance of other members’ advice
= 4 or 5
3337 0.18 0.39
PROENVORIENT = 1 if pro-environmental orientation >
median
3337 0.45 0.50
DISTRIBUTIVE = 1 if feelings of distributive justice >
median
3337 0.43 0.49
PROCEDURAL = 1 if feelings of procedural justice >
median
3337 0.47 0.50
AGM = 1 if frequency of participation = ‘often’ or
‘always’
3337 0.03 0.18
PROFESSIONAL = 1 if individual is a professional 3245 0.03 0.17
SELFEMPLOYED = 1 if individual is self-employed 3245 0.04 0.20
WORKER = 1 if individual is a worker 3245 0.17 0.38
EMPLOYEE = 1 if individual is an employee 3245 0.06 0.24
EXECUTIVE = 1 if individual is an executive 3245 0.39 0.49
OTHERSTATUS = 1 if individual has another employment
status
3245 0.05 0.23
INACTIVE = 1 if individual is inactive (student, retired,
etc.)
3245 0.25 0.43
Source: survey (2014).
model can be derived from a latent variable model (Wooldridge 2002). This is to say
that it assumes that the responses on the indicators of social capital are the result
of an underlying latent variable, y∗i , which is unobservable but can be defined by a
deterministic component (Si) that is observable and a stochastic error term (εi) that is
not observable:
y∗i = Si + εi. (1)
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Assume that Si can be represented by the following additive linear function:
Si = β1E1i + +β2E2i + β3Bi +
n∑
j=1
β jXi, j, (2)
where E1i, E2i and Bi are dummies that indicate the belonging to Ecopower 1,
Ecopower 2 and BeauVent respectively, and Xi is a n length vector of individual i’s char-
acteristics. Hence, the coefficients for the three cohorts of cooperative members need to
be interpreted with reference to Ecopower 3, i.e. those who joined after the cooperative
became an electricity supplier. The ordered probit model assumes that the observed
indicator of social capital (yi) equals j if the latent variable, y∗i , crosses an unknown
threshold:
yi = j if ∝ j −1 < yi∗ ≤ ∝ j, (3)
where ∝ j−1 < ∝ j are unknown threshold parameters. As y∗i crosses increasing threshold
levels (from ∝0 = −∞ to ∝J = ∞), the observed indicator of social capital moves up the
scale (1–5). The probability that individual i will report the level j = 1, . . . ,5 is given by
Pi j = Prob
(∝ j−1<Si + εi ≤ ∝ j
) = Prob(∝ j−1 − Vi<εi ≤ ∝ j − Si). (4)
Using equation (3),
Pi j = 
⎛
⎝∝ j − β1E1i − β2Bi −
n∑
j=1
β jXi, j
⎞
⎠−
⎛
⎝∝ j−1 − β1E1i − β2Bi −
n∑
j=1
β jXi, j
⎞
⎠ ,
(5)
where (·) is the cumulative density function for standard normally distributed errors.
Parameters were estimated by maximum likelihood.
To estimate the presence of other members in social networks, we used a probit
model, since this variable is binary. The specification used is
E(Ni|E1i, E2i, Bi, x) = Prob (Ni = 1|E1i, E2i, Bi, x)
=  (α1E1i + α2Bi + α3x), (6)
where Ni is a binary variable indicating whether individual i has other cooperative
members in her social network (friends, relatives, neighbors) and x is a n length vector
of individual i’s characteristics. The coefficients are directly interpretable in terms of
marginal effects.
A further adjustment is made on the covariance matrix of the estimates. Since
we can assume that correlation is present between the residuals of members within the
same cohort, we use cluster-robust standard errors.
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Table 6 – Mean scores of measures of social capital for the categories of cooperative
members
Ecopower 1 Ecopower 2 Ecopower 3 BeauVent
SOCIDENT 3.78 (43) 3.61 (93) 3.23 (3132) 3.48 (59)
TRUST 4.69 (43) 4.86 (92) 4.56 (3105) 4.51 (59)
NETWORK 0.70 (43) 0.67 (92) 0.58 (3103) 0.70 (56)
Source: Survey (2014). Numbers in parentheses are sample sizes.
4 Results
4.1 Mutual versus public benefit
Before presenting the results of the econometric analysis, Table 6 compares the
mean scores of SOCIDENT, TRUST and NETWORK for the four categories of coopera-
tive members.
As regards SOCIDENT and NETWORK, members belonging to Ecopower 3
present the lowest score on average, while those belonging to Ecopower 1 have the high-
est score. The scores of Ecopower 2 and BeauVent members fall in between. For both
indicators, these differences are statistically significant (SOCIDENT: H(3) = 36.66, p =
0.000. NETWORK: χ2(3) = 8.75, p = 0.033) Regarding TRUST, members belonging to
Ecopower 2 have the highest interpersonal trust on average, whereas BeauVent mem-
bers present the lowest average score. These differences are also statistically significant
(H(3) = 7.047, p = 0.070).11
Estimation results for the multivariate regressions are displayed in Table 7.
Tukey–Pregibon link specification tests were performed after each regression (Hilbe
2009). In each case, the link test revealed no problem with our specifications. Columns
(1)–(3) correspond to our first dependent variable, SOCIDENT, while columns (5) and
(6) correspond to TRUST and NETWORK respectively. Different specifications are es-
timated and control variables are added gradually. Column (1) exclusively contains the
cooperative dummies and basic socio-demographic variables. Column (2) introduces the
motivations to join the cooperative as additional control variables. Next, columns (3)–
(5) include socio-psychological variables and the frequency of participation to general
meetings.
As shown in column (1), belonging to Ecopower 1, Ecopower 2 and BeauVent
appreciably increases the likelihood that the respondent strongly identifies with the
cooperative. Among control variables, education has a significantly positive marginal
effect, while income influences the outcome negatively.
Column (2) introduces the effects of the motivations to join the cooperative. The
marginal effects of belonging to Ecopower 1, Ecopower 2 and BeauVent are still very
significantly positive. In addition, the production of renewable energy, the democratic
nature of cooperative governance and advice of other members are positively associated
with social identification.
11 For a more detailed comparison between these four groups, see Bauwens (2016).
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Table 7 – Social capital and mutual versus public benefit
Social identification
Generalized
trust
Members in
social network
Ordered probit Ordered probit
Ordered
probit Ordered probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ECOPOWER1 0.54*** (0.01) 0.36*** (0.01) 0.27*** (0.01) −0.11*** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.00)
ECOPOWER2 0.45*** (0.00) 0.49*** (0.00) 0.39*** (0.00) 0.19*** (0.00) 0.12*** (0.00)
BEAUVENT 0.28*** (0.00) 0.24*** (0.00) 0.07** (0.03) −0.05** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.01)
EDUCATION 0.07*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) −0.02***(0.01) 0.12*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.01)
INCOME −0.05*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
GENDER 0.04 (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.12*** (0.01) −0.06** (0.03) −0.01 (0.02)
AGE 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00)
DEMOCRATIC 0.66*** (0.01) 0.62*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
GREEN 0.63*** (0.01) 0.47*** (0.01) 0.14*** (0.03) −0.03*** (0.01)
ROI −0.02 (0.01) 0.04*** (0.02) −0.17*** (0.00) 0.06*** (0.01)
PRICE 0.04** (0.02) 0.09*** (0.02) −0.07*** (0.01) −0.04*** (0.01)
ADVICE 0.26*** (0.03) 0.26*** (0.02) 0.08** (0.02) 0.13*** (0.02)
PROENVORIENT 0.60*** (0.02) 0.12*** (0.03) 0.06*** (0.01)
DISTRIBUTIVE −0.13***(0.02) −0.29*** (0.01) −0.01*** (0.00)
PROCEDURAL 0.17*** (0.02) 0.47*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.00)
AGM 0.55*** (0.10) −0.08 (0.09) 0.11*** (0.02)
Fixed effects for
professional
status
YES YES YES YES YES
N 2866 2866 2866 2867 2839
Pseudo-R² 0.004 0.0430 0.060 0.029 0.024
Source: Survey (2014). Note: Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
Column (3) shows that when controlling for socio-psychological characteristics, the
positive marginal effects of belonging to Ecopower 1, Ecopower 2 and BeauVent are still
strongly significant. Pro-environmental orientation and procedural feelings of justice
have a significantly positive marginal effect on social identification. This indicates that
members who have strong environmental concerns and who think that the world is fair
from a procedural perspective tend to identify more with the cooperative. By contrast,
feelings of distributive justice are negatively related with SOCIDENT. This suggests
that on average, those who think that the world is fair from a distributive perspective
identify less with the cooperative.
A frequent participation to general assemblies is significantly positively associated
with social identification. This result is likely to reflect a two-way causal relationship: a
strong identification with the cooperative fosters active participation to decision-making
processes and, conversely, frequent attendance to general meetings may reinforce the
feeling of belonging to the organization.
As regards the other two dependent variables, belonging to Ecopower 1 and to
BeauVent has a significantly negative effect on generalized interpersonal trust, while the
effect of belonging to Ecopower 2 is significantly positive. This seemingly contradictory
result is discussed further in Section 5. As for the presence of other members in social
networks, the three coefficients are significantly positive.
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Figure 1 – Spatial density of BeauVent membership in Flanders.
Source: Created by the authors with the Philcarto software on the basis of the data provided by
the cooperative.
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Figure 2 – Spatial density of Ecopower 1 and Ecopower 2 in Flanders.
Source: Created by the authors with the Philcarto software on the basis of the data provided by
the cooperative.
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
4.2 Introducing the spatial dimension of social capital
In Section 2.3.2., it was argued that the spatial characteristics of the membership
may have an influence on the formation of social capital. In this section, spatial factors
and their influence on social capital are further explored.
Data provided by the cooperatives enable us to compute the geographical distribu-
tion of the whole population of cooperative members at the municipality level. Figures
1, 2 and 3 present the maps of the density of members (computed as the percentage
of cooperative members in the total municipality population) in the different Flemish
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Figure 3 – Spatial density of Ecopower 3 in Flanders.
Source: Created by the authors with the Philcarto software on the basis of the data provided by
the cooperative.
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
municipalities for BeauVent, Ecopower 1 and 2,12 andEcopower 3 respectively.While the
third cohort of Ecopower members (Figure 3) is distributed relatively evenly throughout
Flanders, with some more densely populated areas in cities such as Ghent and Leuven,
BeauVent members (Figure 1) are far more concentrated in the Western part of the
region, where the different projects run by the cooperative are located.
Finally, regarding the first two cohorts of Ecopowermembers (Figure 2), the spatial
pattern is less clear, partly because the absolute number of members is much lower than
in the other two groups. The only municipality with a density of over 0.30 per cent of
members is Eeklo, in East Flanders. This is where the cooperative installed its first wind
turbines in 2000 and launched a recruitment campaign to attract newmembers. Overall,
there are appreciable differences in the spatial distribution of the different groups of
cooperative members. BeauVent membership is the group for which spatial patterns are
the clearest. BeauVent members form a community that is much more based on place
as compared to the two cohorts of Ecopower members.
Furthermore, it is interesting to combine these spatial distributions with data
about the degree of urbanization of Flemish municipalities, based on the OECD concept
of urbanization.13 Figure 4 presents amap of urban and ruralmunicipalities in Flanders.
As shown on the map, many rural municipalities are located in West Flanders and
correspond to those where BeauVent members are more concentrated. In fact, 20 per
cent of all BeauVent members live in a rural municipality, as compared to only 2.22
per cent of Ecopower members. This difference is statistically significant (χ ² = 2.3e+03,
12 Ecopower 1 and Ecopower 2 have been analyzed together owing to the few observations
relating to them.
13 According to the OECD, a municipality is rural if its population density is inferior to 150
inhab./km².
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Figure 4 – Urban and rural municipalities in Flanders, 2014.
Source: Created by the authors with the Philcarto software on the basis of the data provided by
the cooperatives and Service Public Fe´de´ral E´conomie (2014).
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
p = 0.000). Thus, the spatial characteristics of Ecopower and BeauVent membership
differ in twoways: first, BeauVentmembers aremore spatially concentrated and, second,
a higher proportion of them is located in rural areas as compared to Ecopower members.
In turn, these additional spatial differences can be expected to have some influence on
members’ social capital, as suggested in Section 2.3.2.
To account for these spatial patterns in our data, we made several adjustments
to the econometric regressions (Table 8). Given that cooperative members are clus-
tered in the 308 municipalities of Flanders, we included fixed effects ηm for each
municipality in the models. In doing so, we control for unobserved heterogeneity
at the municipality level. Since cooperative members are clustered both within a
group and within a municipality, we have to adjust errors to account for correlation
along both dimensions. One way of controlling for clustering in two non nested
dimensions is to use two-way cluster-robust standard errors (Cameron et al. 2011).
Petersen (2009), however, shows that when there are only a few clusters in one
dimension, clustering by the more frequent cluster yields results that are almost
identical to clustering by both dimensions. This is confirmed by Thompson (2011)
and Cameron et al. (2011), who show that double clustering makes sense only when
we have sufficient clusters along both dimensions. In our case, the number of group
clusters is very small (3) as compared to the number of municipalities (308). For
this reason, we use cluster-robust standard errors for correlation within municipality
only.
As regards social identification, the marginal effects of belonging to the first
two cohorts of Ecopower members are still significantly positive in both cases, while
belonging to BeauVent does not play a significant role. Regarding interpersonal trust
and the presence of other members in the social network, the coefficient of ECOPOWER2
is significantly positive; the coefficients of ECOPOWER1 and BEAUVENT, however,
are not significant.
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Table 8 – Introducing the spatial dimension of social capital
Social
identification
Generalized
trust
Members in
social network
Ordered
probit
Ordered
probit Probit
ECOPOWER1 0.31* (0.17) −0.13 (0.23) 0.11 (0.11)
ECOPOWER2 0.37*** (0.13) 0.23* (0.13) 0.16** (0.06)
BEAUVENT −0.02 (0.13) −0.03 (0.18) 0.08 (0.11)
EDUCATION −0.04 (0.03) 0.12*** (0.04) 0.02 (0.02)
INCOME 0.03 (0.04) 0.12*** (0.03) 0.01 (0.02)
GENDER 0.11** (0.05) −0.07 (0.05) −0.01 (0.03)
AGE 0.01** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 0.00* (0.00)
DEMOCRATIC 0.67*** (0.06) 0.09 (0.05) 0.04 (0.02)
GREEN 0.50*** (0.05) 0.13** (0.05) −0.03 (0.03)
ROI 0.03 (0.05) −0.19*** (0.05) 0.06** (0.03)
PRICE 0.06 (0.04) −0.05 (0.05) −0.04** (0.02)
ADVICE 0.25*** (0.05) 0.10 (0.06) 0.14*** (0.02)
PROENVORIENT 0.64*** (0.04) 0.16*** (0.05) 0.08*** (0.02)
DISTRIBUTIVE −0.13** (0.05) −030*** (0.05) −0.01 (0.02)
PROCEDURAL 0.18*** (0.05) 0.49*** (0.04) 0.02 (0.02)
AGM 0.56*** (0.12) −0.13 (0.14) 0.11* (0.06)
Fixed effects for professional status YES YES YES
Fixed effects for Municipalities YES YES YES
N 2836 2837 2767
Pseudo-R² 0.0801 0.054 0.079
Source: Survey (2014). Note: Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
5 Discussion
The main finding of this paper is that the type and level of social capital clearly
differs depending on whether the cooperative is oriented toward mutual or public ben-
efit. Indeed, Ecopower members who joined the organization during the ‘public bene-
fit’ phases and BeauVent members identify more strongly with the cooperative than
Ecopower members who joined it during the ‘mutual benefit’ phase. In addition, belong-
ing to the early cohorts of Ecopower and to BeauVent has positive marginal effects on
the probability of having fellow members in one’s direct social network. Hence, contrary
to what Hatak et al. (2016) argue, mutual benefit does not appear to be associated with
a tight-knit, closed network structure. Rather, the results suggest that an orientation
toward mutual benefit is correlated with a more open network structure and weaker
ties between members.
The results for generalized interpersonal trust are less clear-cut. Having joined
Ecopower during its first phase or belonging to BeauVent is negatively associated with
generalized trust; on the other hand, having joined Ecopower in its second phase is
negatively related with the latter, and leads to contradictory results. Moreover, when
controlling for municipality fixed effects, there is no significant difference between the
first cohort of Ecopowermembers orBeauVentmembers and the third cohort of Ecopower
members. This raises the question whether generalized trust is an adequate measure of
cooperative members’ social capital in the first place. Indeed, in contrast to the other two
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Figure 5 – The relationship between mutual benefit and social capital.
Source: Constructed by authors.
forms of social capital which are directly linked to cooperative membership, generalized
trust is a vague and abstract concept which reflects a general propensity to trust others
without reference to any specific setting. Furthermore, according to different studies,
survey measures related to generalized trust are not necessarily good predictors of
actual trusting behavior in experimental trust games (Glaeser et al. 2000; Ostrom and
Ahn 2003). Thus, the inconclusive results that we observed may be due to the limitations
of measures of generalized trust for capturing the social capital created in cooperatives.
Yet, the identification of significant effects in the case of social identification and
network structure does not explain the underlying mechanisms behind the relationship
between the orientation toward mutual or public benefit and social capital. Three factors
are likely to play a role in explaining this relationship. First, we have seen that spatial
factors had an important influence. Indeed, the positive marginal effects of belonging
to BeauVent on social identification and the presence of other members in the individ-
ual’s social network vanish when controlling for municipality fixed effects. This result
suggests that the difference between BeauVent members and late Ecopower members is
mediated by the distinct spatial patterns of the groups. This result also holds for the first
cohort of Ecopower members as regards the presence of other members in one’s social
network. Second, spatial factors are closely related with organizational growth. Indeed,
the process of organizational transition from a public to amutual benefit orientation that
Ecopower went through was accompanied by a sustained expansion of the number of
members and of the geographical scope of its activities. However, the effect of belonging
to the second cohort of Ecopower is robust to the inclusion of spatial variables. This sug-
gests that spatial factors do not entirely explain the difference between Ecopower 1 and
Ecopower 3. An additional explanatory factormay be related to the very nature ofmutual
benefit. Indeed, in the case of electricity supply, the benefits to members take the form
of a market relationship. Now, it was argued in Section 2.2. that market interactions
limit the creation of social capital, as they are typically characterized by ephemerality
of contact and anonymity among interacting actors. Hence, by attaching benefits in the
form of electricity supply to cooperative membership, Ecopower may have modified the
incentive structure faced by existing and potential members. Ecopower then started at-
tracting members who were quite distinct from early members and who developed more
of a customer attitude in wanting to benefit from the advantages of electricity supply
without being strongly involved. This modified the composition of the membership and
diluted its social capital. In line with this interpretation, Bauwens (2016) shows that
late Ecopower members not only identify less with the cooperative and have weaker
linkages with other cooperative members, but are more motivated by the economic
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incentives linked to electricity supply than early Ecopower members. Figure 5 summa-
rizes these relationships.
6 Conclusion
Cooperatives may play an important role in transitions toward a sustainable econ-
omy through the creation or mobilization of social capital. Yet, the different organiza-
tional models in this sector may be associated with distinct types and levels of social
capital. This paper sought to assess the differences between mutual and public benefit
organizations in terms of the type and level of social capital they contain, focusing on
the case of renewable energy cooperatives. Overall, our results indicate that mutual
and public benefit organizations are indeed characterized by different types and lev-
els of social capital. An orientation toward public (mutual) benefit is associated with
a closed (open) network structure and a stronger (weaker) social identification to the
organization.
As in any research project, the choicesmade in this study reveal some limitations in
our findings, which suggest various avenues for future research. First, the relationship
between mutual benefit and market interactions highlighted above is fundamentally
related to the type of cooperatives analyzed here, namely consumer cooperatives. In other
types of cooperatives, mutual benefit may take other forms than a market transaction.
For instance, in a worker’s cooperative, the relationship that connects the cooperative to
its members is typically an employment contract. Thus it would be interesting to look at
this relationship in other types of cooperatives as well as other types of social economy
organizations.
Second, our data is a cross-sectional snapshot of current members, while the pro-
cess in which we are interested occurred in the past. This temporal discrepancy may
introduce a bias. In particular, as social capital may decrease over time because of orga-
nizational growth and the introduction of market incentives, the positive association of
public benefit with social capital might be underestimated. Similarly, there may be some
overlap between the public and mutual benefit settings. For instance, many members
belonging to Ecopower 1, Ecopower 2 and BeauVent are today supplied by Ecopower,
although they did not join Ecopower during its supply phase.14 However, our statisti-
cally significant differences between groups suggest that the distinction betweenmutual
and public benefit does matter, even in the presence of these potential biases. It would
be interesting to collect longitudinal data to assess the evolution of social capital over
time.
Third, it would be insightful to further explore the relationships between the ori-
entation toward mutual and public benefit, spatial factors and organizational growth.
Our paper has highlighted a positive relationship between mutual benefit, strong orga-
nizational growth and increasing spatial distance. Again, it would be interesting to know
14 More precisely, 93.0%, 96.8%, 95.5% and 37.3% of Ecopower 1, Ecopower 2, Ecopower 3 and
BeauVent members respectively are supplied by Ecopower.
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whether this relationship holds in other types of cooperatives, in other SE organizations
and in other geographical contexts.
In terms of policy and managerial implications, the findings highlight the trade-
off that is likely to arise between the creation and maintenance of a high level of social
capital and the scaling up of activities. On the one hand, mutual service provision is a
powerful incentive to attract new members and raise financial capital, thereby scaling
up positive societal impacts and ensuring financial viability of organizations. On the
other hand, the downside is that this mutuality dimension weakens the social capital
within organizations, as the case of Ecopower shows. Hence, the findings suggest that
managers should compensate the weakening of social bonds between members linked
to the orientation toward mutual benefit by ways to reconnect with the social base of
economic activities. Alternatively, RE cooperative managers could favor growth paths
other than an increase of members and an accumulation of assets in a single organi-
zation, e.g. through the replication and franchising of a successful business model or
through the free and open flow of knowledge and the sharing of relevant experience.
The constitution of inter-organizational networks is another interesting way to respond
to the problems of small scale and limited resources and skills (see e.g. Sacchetti and
Tortia 2016). By constituting networks, SE organizations are able to attain economies
of scale by sharing information, equipment, and skills. Cooperation in the local business
networks that constitute ‘the third Italy’ along with their local governments provides
one example of such an inter-organizational network. By creating economies of scale in
marketing, research and training, inter-firm cooperation enables small firms in North-
ern Italy to compete with giant corporations. Hence, developing inter-organizational
networks seems to be a prominent way to preserve the benefits of local anchorage of
initiatives and simultaneously take advantage of economies of scale and the connections
to the wider sustainability agenda at the national and international levels.
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